The Spirit Level

In this chapter, Wilkinson and Pickett investigate the causes of violence. The authors observe that many people live in fear of violent crime, and that violence is an ongoing social problem in many countries. The majority of violent crimes are committed by young men in their teens and twenties. Young men from impoverished backgrounds are more likely to be perpetrators (and victims) of violent crime.

Psychiatrist James Gilligan believes that violence is usually triggered by humiliation and a perceived threat to one’s pride. Evolutionary psychologists Margo Wilson and Martin Daly argue that young men are more likely to react violently to these humiliations because, subconsciously, their sexual success depends on retaining a powerful status. The authors connect this theory to their own, explaining that men who resort to violence do so because they are “deprived of all markers of status” and are therefore more likely to vigorously defend their sense of pride (134). Wilkinson and Pickett contend that in more unequal societies status matters more because people have more gain by defending their status. According to the authors, most people can maintain their status through material belongings, education, jobs, and connections, but poorer people do not have these “trappings of status,” and so are more likely to react violently to humiliation (141). This helps to explain higher rates of violence in unequal countries.

The authors use statistics from the United Nations to show homicide rates in different countries, emphasizing how murder rates are higher in more unequal nations such as Portugal and the US, while they are substantially lower in equal countries like Japan, Norway, and Denmark. They acknowledge that there are outliers; for instance, Singapore has a low murder rate, but high inequality. Using data from the FBI, the authors also show that there is some correlation between homicide and inequality in individual US states.

Men who grew up in fatherless homes are overrepresented among violent criminals. Young men who do not have fathers tend to engage in “hyper masculine” behaviors such as sexual promiscuity and crime (137). One theory posits that these young men favor short-term conquests and a focus on high status as their reproductive strategy, rather than pursuing a long-term relationship.

The authors point to high school massacres as more evidence that threats to pride, such as bullying, can trigger violent episodes. Experiencing violence in childhood is the best predictor of becoming violent as an adult. Environmental differences also matter; communities with more social trust have lower crime rates than communities without it. Wilkinson and Pickett conclude their chapter by reiterating that inequality and violence are linked, and that reducing inequality is sure to decrease levels of violence.

Crime rates do not accurately predict the amount of people in a country’s prison, since imprisonment depends on severity of the crime committed, and the country’s sentencing practices. For instance, the Netherlands has a similar crime rate to Britain but a lower rate of imprisonment because only more serious criminals are given a custodial sentence. The authors argue that a country’s level of inequality is a better predictor of imprisonment rates. Using UN statistics, the authors graph developed countries’ imprisonment rates, which reveals a strong relationship between financial inequality and imprisonment, with Singapore and the US topping the charts, while Japan and Norway have the lowest rates of imprisonment.

The authors maintain that more unequal societies are more punitive in every aspect of criminal sentencing. For instance, prisons in the Netherlands prioritize rehabilitation and treatment of prisoners and include humane policies like education and recreation. In Japan, criminals who confess and commit to reform are treated leniently and imprisoned in humane prisons where they have access to training and education. In stark contrast, the US maintains much harsher prisons with fewer programs for prisoners and higher rates of brutality and punitive practices. More equal states have prisons with more positive programs, like mental health screening, recreation, and more. Ironically, it does not seem that longer or harsher prison sentences act as a deterrent to criminals; longer sentences still have high recidivism rates. The authors observe that unequal societies are more likely to foster “attitudes of ‘us and them’” which spurs the government and the public to develop “punitive attitudes” towards criminals (154). Moreover, countries that spend more on prisons tend to spend less on “positive spending” such as education and welfare (155). They conclude that unequal countries are “harsher, tougher places” (154).

Modern societies afford people more social mobility than in the past, however, the amount of social mobility varies across countries. It is a particularly difficult thing to measure because it requires long-term data. The authors use “income mobility” to measure social mobility, as it reveals how much someone’s income changes throughout their lives (157). The authors could only access data on social mobility from eight developed countries. The statistics reveal that countries with low inequality such as Norway and Sweden have high social mobility, while countries with higher inequality like the UK and US have much lower social mobility. In these nations parents’ incomes are highly predictive of their children’s incomes: children tend to stay in the same social class they were born into.

The authors argue that the geographical segregation of rich and poor into distinct neighborhoods further restricts social mobility by impacting people’s health and access to opportunities. Wilkinson and Pickett agree with French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who claims that inequality divides people into more distinct social classes, which develop their own subcultures. This hierarchical division of society differentiates the poorest people from the rest, promoting discrimination against them and discouraging them from “believing they can better their position” (163).

The authors believe that differing social norms, etiquette, and taste can be weaponized against the poor and make them feel inferior. This “downward prejudice” creates a “bicycling reaction” in which people who feel rejected and humiliated are more likely to lash out at others in displaced aggression (166). The authors offer numerous anecdotes from anthropological studies as evidence. The authors conclude that in unequal societies people are more likely to try to act in a dominant, rather than inclusive, way and that larger differences in income appear to cement the social structure and reduce social mobility.