The Open Society and Its Enemies

In “The Aftermath,” Popper discusses the sources of our knowledge, biases, and ideologies and advocates for democratic institutions as guarantors of freedom of thought and progress (429). Our thoughts are part of the greater social environment. This environment is responsible for the thinker’s opinions even if those opinions seem naturally occurring (420). The system of assumptions in its entirety is referred to as “total ideology” (420). Sociology of knowledge is a subject area focused on identifying and analyzing the way that knowledge and reason are linked to society (421, 431). Along with Kant, Popper subscribes to the “activist theory of knowledge” (421), rather than “the receptacle theory of knowledge” (420). Knowledge is not a gift but the logical consequence of one’s own mental labor.

The notion that opinions are determined by class interest advocated by Marx is in line with the sociology of knowledge (429). Popper considers the tension between the rational and the irrational to be one of the key problems of the 20th century with roots in ancient Greece (429, 434). He defines rationalism as an acceptance of opposing arguments and learning from them—this is Socratic rationalism (431, 433). Indeed, every human can serve as the source of learning and deserves to be heard (431, 442). The author contrasts this “rational unity of mankind” with the Platonic idea that superior reason is in charge of our learning and knowledge (431, 432). However, rationalism has limitations in questions of morality, and we must also consider emotions as definitive of our attitudes (437, 433).

According to Popper, rationalism can be critical or uncritical. He subscribes to the former position because he prefers the scientific method and argumentation. (442) The latter is indicative of not acknowledging anything that cannot be defended through experience or with an argument (435). Further yet is the position of irrationalism, which locates the source of human actions in passions (438-39). Popper finds this position problematic because it encompasses negative emotions such as hatred and envy, which may result in violence (439). In fact, he locates collectivist, tribalist modes of thought, such as “our blood,” “our national heritage,” “with our class,” or “by God’s grace” in irrationalism (440). However, authentic creativity is also born of irrationality to the point that it becomes a “mystical faculty” (433-34). The author suggests, from an institutional perspective (443), combining rationality with imagination for optimal results, “The rational and imaginative analysis of the consequences of a moral theory has a certain analogy in scientific method” (438).

Popper ends this section by analyzing two “irrationalist authorities,” Alfred North Whitehead, a British philosopher of science, and Arnold J. Toynbee, a British historian. He briefly discusses their respective works, Whitehead’s Process and Reality, focused on key metaphysical ideas, and Toynbee’s multi-volume A Study of History—a historicist work on the lifecycle of civilizations (450-54). Popper qualifies Whitehead’s text as neo-Hegelian and evasive of Kantian critique of speculative philosophy (452). As for Toynbee, Popper describes him as an anti-rational historicist who chose to focus on the history of emotions or irrational interpretations of events (455, 458).