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Diplomacy
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Themes
Realpolitik Versus Ideological Leadership
Content Warning: This summary contains some descriptions of the effects of war and follows a Eurocentric, androcentric perspective on global affairs, history, and society. This book also contains problematic and offensive arguments about the United States’ role in global politics and its treatment of such nations as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Chile, minimizing the atrocities of the interventions in these places.
Kissinger sees throughout diplomatic history a dichotomy between two approaches. One is called realpolitik, or raison d’état, or realism, all referring to the pursuit of material power by one state at the expense of others. Realpolitik often requires amoral or even immoral means to achieve its ends, most notably the use of force, but such methods are necessary to achieve stability in a world where one cannot trust others to act altruistically; parties will therefore subject their states to the risk of instability or even collapse if they try to govern on the basis of morals rather than the harsh realities of politics. The great practitioners of realpolitik include Cardinal Richelieu of France, Prince Metternich of Austria, and Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of Germany, with Stalin and Richard Nixon earning honorable mentions. For Kissinger, the skillful practice of realpolitik is almost a guarantee for success; Richelieu turned France into a Great Power, Metternich helped found an unprecedented era of peace and stability in Europe, and Bismarck achieved what is possibly the greatest feat in European diplomatic history, the unification of Germany. If the practitioners of realpolitik are to make a mistake, Kissinger says, it will be in their insistence on viewing the world “as any eighteenth-century prince would have” and thereby assuming that everyone else thinks same way (406). Realpolitik is the political force of European modernity, or at least the successful one, and it is pitted against idealism.
In opposition to ways of realpolitik stood those concerned with ideology. Richelieu, Metternich, and Bismarck each had to deal with ideologues in their own day, people who were committed to doctrines of religion or nationalism and saw them as absolute truths to be imposed on the rest of the world. For Kissinger, this problem became infinitely worse with the rise of democracy, and especially with the United States and its thoroughly democratic tradition. Trained by their domestic experience to believe in law and social harmony as the natural order of things, and forced to accommodate a public that lacks deep knowledge of world affairs, democracies are, in Kissinger’s view, clunky, erratic, and blind to nuance. The United States, for example, is forever torn between dueling impulses, “acting as a beacon for mankind” and focusing on domestic problems, or acting on “an obligation to crusade for [liberal values] around the world” (18). According to Kissinger, the best that such a state can hope for is a wise leader, such as Theodore Roosevelt or Richard Nixon, who can gratify public opinion by appealing to their ideals while using those fanciful notions to cover up the substance of a realpolitik approach.
Kissinger clearly believes in the supremacy of the realpolitik approach. Although both have shaped the modern world, Kissinger believes that realpolitik has shaped it successfully and should be the approach moving forward. Countries practicing realpolitik should aim to minimize ideological influence in their dealings, while still appeasing those ideologues who believe it is the best way of governing or necessary to the practices of a particular nation, such as the United States. Previously, the US enjoyed a privileged position of not really having to engage with the realities of politics, in Kissinger’s view. Now with the end of the Cold War the country will need to, and Kissinger suggests it cannot succeed without becoming more realpolitik focused and less Wilsonian.
The Limits of Genius of the Statesman
Much of Kissinger’s narrative focuses on the works of individuals (all of them men, it should be noted), who by force of their intellect and will are capable of shaping the world in their image. For Kissinger, a great statesman defies the conventional wisdom of their era, such as Richelieu defying the Catholic sensibilities of his time (and ecclesiastical office) to ally with Protestant German princes against the Holy Roman Empire (Kissinger describes Richelieu as thoroughly innovative in this respect, but the French king Francis I undertook the even more shocking policy of ratifying an alliance with the Ottoman sultan a century prior to Richelieu). Metternich built a European order that lasted nearly a century, with only brief outbursts of war and social upheaval, and Bismarck achieved what centuries’ worth of European diplomacy had sought to prevent, the formation of a unified Germany. Kissinger is a devout follower of what is called “the Great Man Theory of History,” where events revolve around extraordinary individuals (again, for Kissinger, they are all men). In the aforementioned cases, this was mostly for good, but it can also be for evil, as Kissinger regards the Second World War as “the work of one demonic personality” (288) whose removal from the scene would have entirely changed the course of events. Kissinger tends to define these mostly male figures as being great in their individuality, defying social expectations to lead in the way they think is best. This automatically implies a realpolitik approach on their part, as they do not rule according to a doctrine, such as a religion, but according to a specific context and situation, using their own beliefs and assumptions, their own kind of internal logic, to determine how best to navigate global issues. This approach again emphasizes a realist, individualist approach that is not ruled by group or ideological logic.
While Kissinger heaps praise on figures like Richelieu and Bismarck, however, he also notes that they could not build anything lasting. This was not due so much to their own limitations as to the limitations of history itself and human mortality. He concedes that for a figure like Richelieu, “raison d’état had no built-in limitation” and was therefore prone to overextension, with the possible exception of “a master” (66) holding the reins. Since states cannot always count on geniuses in positions of leadership, he believes, the works of geniuses are liable to decay and collapse. Richelieu managed to die with France in a strong position, but his successor Mazarin saw France humbled by domestic turmoil and a hostile coalition on each of its borders. Metternich was turned out of office when the revolutionary forces he sought to contain erupted across Europe in 1848. Bismarck was unceremoniously dismissed by the young Kaiser Wilhelm II, who would go on to plunge Europe into the apocalypse of World War I. Bismarck is the apotheosis of genius in Kissinger’s estimation, but even had he remained in power until his death, his brilliant style “was becoming incompatible with an age of mass public opinion” (161). The world always undoes the work of great statesmen, Kissinger argues, but the rise of democracy would make it prohibitively harder for them to build anything up in the first place. Kissinger suggests that, for America, it will be harder to navigate global issues as a democracy; it has been spared difficult choices only because of previous isolationism or political supremacy. Democracy, in his view, is always an ideological principle at odds with realpolitik; it will limit the power of those who should be in charge. However, it should be noted that democracy, as an ideological principle, is intentionally a limit on the power of any one individual who does not believe in, or obey, limitations.
Balancing Power Through Legitimacy and Realpolitik
As a realist, Kissinger believes that the struggle for power is the most important fact of politics, especially international politics where there is no central authority capable of enforcing a common set of laws. The most successful practitioners of politics, he believes, are those that recognize the facts of power and bend them to their advantage, while those who operate in the realm of abstract, moral ideas are practically guaranteed to fail. Yet Kissinger, along with many other members of the realist tradition, counsels against the exercise of power for its own sake. Power is an inherently finite quality, and those whose ambitions exceed their capabilities (Hitler, most notably) will bring catastrophe down upon their states. The problem with ideologues is not so much that their ideas are wrong, he states, but rather that those ideas infuse them with a universal sense of mission that is bound to exceed their resources. There is also the problem of international order. All states have ambitions and can be expected to pursue them, but without some sort of overarching idea of how a system of states should operate, the result would be a Hobbesian war of all against all, as occurred during the First World War. These are all problems of power and global politics that have to be dealt with—in Kissinger’s opinion, with realpolitik—as America begins a new era in which it is neither isolationist nor politically supreme. The goal would be to move closer toward an international agreement on and understanding of legitimacy. Too much and too little power will destroy the equilibrium.
Power thus needs to be coupled with a notion of legitimacy. The most classic, realist notion of legitimacy is the balance of power, or “equilibrium” (19), where no state is strong enough to dominate others, and therefore each state (or at least each of the Great Powers) can reliably defend its vital interests. This idea found its purest expression under Richelieu, as a world of kings and princes were free to view the world as a kind of chessboard. Metternich had to deal with the problem of social revolution and therefore built an order based on the principle of monarchical legitimacy, with states retaining the right to intervene across borders in order to defend thrones against popular uprisings. In the 20th century, legitimacy would mostly come from democratic notions of liberty and self-determination, which Kissinger finds to be extremely difficult to align with the realities of power. The United States found some success in building a liberal international order because in the wake of the Second World War, it had an extraordinary margin of power with which to implement its preferences. With its power in relative decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kissinger affirms that a new principle of legitimacy is required to achieve a new sense of equilibrium. As he argues, however, legitimacy can only be determined from the logic of events; it cannot be imposed from the top down. He therefore states that America must watch this sequence of events and navigate them through realpolitik. Without using realpolitik to understand and establish legitimacy, power will become unbalanced and major wars will happen, possibly resulting in America’s destruction or loss of influence.
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