Democracy in America

Tocqueville argues that American society is dynamic but that “all the changes are similar”; nearly all are driven by changes in economic and financial situations. Money is the main source of distinction remaining to democratic peoples. This is enhanced by so many pursuing industrial careers, where the path to success is similar. Tocqueville argues that this convergence is a global phenomenon and people in general are becoming more alike.

Like definitions of manners, Tocqueville argues that concepts of honor, or “the aid of which a people or a class distributes blame or praise” (590), depends on social context and social structure. Tocqueville asserts, “that one attached honor or shame to the actions of a man according to his condition—that resulted from the very constitution of an aristocratic society” (590). Aristocratic societies thus valued behavior that “combined with love of power” like battle campaigns (591). Honor in politics was synonymous with loyalty to one’s social superiors, especially local lords; patriotism focused on people rather than nations.

American honor, in contrast, is tied to the country’s economic system and appreciation for commerce. Tocqueville argues, “peaceful virtues that tend to give a regular pace to the social body and to favor trade must therefore be specially honored among this people” (594). Correspondingly, Americans are fairly tolerant of wealth acquisition and eagerness for it. They save their rigidity for matters of moral conduct in marriage and family life because disruptions there “trouble the internal order of the family, so necessary to success in business” (595). Again, Tocqueville is attentive to how economic and social systems influence cultural values, especially when he argues that Americans do not permit “idleness” even among the wealthy, where aristocracies prize not working. Notions of honor depend on class difference or “castes,” so the more these distinctions erode or are flexible, the fewer notions of honor will emerge. As Tocqueville argues, “Honor in democratic nations, being ill-defined, is necessarily less powerful; for it is difficult to apply certainly and firmly a law that is imperfectly known” (597). Tocqueville treats codes of honor as a method of social control rather than equating them with morality. Thus, honor codes dissipate when they no longer serve a specific function.

Tocqueville’s study of ambition also turns on social change. Revolutionary periods are naturally ambitious ages, as social tumult offers new opportunities. Tocqueville argues that more stable democracies, however, will see ambition become more moderate, as resources and opportunities become more evenly distributed and great undertakings become less possible. What social rises occur are necessarily less rapid. Tocqueville is concerned that this will lead to a “mediocrity of desires” and an excessive focus on private life in democratic states, and proposes that citizens should be given “difficult and perilous affairs” to occupy them (604). Tocqueville is not always internally consistent; he supports democratic family structure but is concerned that too much preoccupation with private life is ultimately bad for national health. He is open about the chaos that revolutions bring yet holds up “perilous affairs” as a remedy for complacency.

Though he admits that this is more common in Europe than America, Tocqueville is also concerned that individual ambition finds outlets other than seeking public office or bureaucratic positions. To position this as the solution is to try to “satisfy with limited means desires that multiply without limits” (605). Tocqueville argues that “would have been more honest and more sure to teach each of their subjects the art of being self-sufficient” (606). Tocqueville thus positions dependence on government as a negative thing, especially when government alone forms one’s livelihood.